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ARREST WITH AND WITHOUT A WARRANT*
The following artike is in substance the brief on the questions dis-
cussed in the commentaries prepared by the author and printed by the
American Law Institute for the use of its members and the profession
generally in considering the tentative drafts of that part of the Restate-
ment of the Law known as Torts Restatement No. 3.
This article deals with a number of problems, more or less
disconnected, which arise in determining the circumstances under
which either a private person or a peace officer is privileged to use
force to arrest without a warrant, and the amount of force which
may be used to effect an arrest either with or without a warrant.
L
THE PRIVILEGE To ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT FOR A
MISDEMEANOR OTHER THAN A BREACH OF THE PEACE.
Until the case of Carroll v. U. S.,1 the statements both of
judicial decisions and textbooks were substantially unanimous
to the effect that there was no privilege to arrest without a war-
rant for a misdemeanor other than a breach of the peace, except
in the case of a few misdemeanors such as "night walking" and
"riding armed" for which authority to arrest without a warrant
had been given by statutes so ancient that the statutory origin
*Copyright by the American Law Institute
267 U. S. 137 (1925).
(485)
486 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
of the privilege had been forgotten and the privilege regarded as
substantially one at common law.
It is usually said that not even a peace officer is privileged
to make an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor which
does not amount to a breach of the peace 2 and there are many
cases which expressly deny the privilege to arrest for such a
misdeameanor. 3
It has been said that seven states grant to peace officers,
though not to private persons, a privilege, to arrest without a
warrant for any misdemeanor committed in their presence.
State v. Dietz 4 is the only case which actually so decides. In
none of the other cases is there more than language which
scarcely reaches the dignity of a dictum. In some of them the
offense for which the arrest was made was a breach of the peace.5
In others the arrest was for a misdemeanor not committed in
the presence of the officer making the arrest.6 In none of them
'I CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAW *15; CROCKER, DuTIEs OF SHEIuFrs (3d ed.
I890) §§ 48, 53; 9 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 612; HAWLEY, LAW OF AR.
REST (3d ed. I919) § 51; VOORHEES, ARREST (1904) § 131; I WHARTON, CRIM-
INAI PROCEDURE (ioth ed. 1918) § 35; Wilgus, Arrest Without Warrant, 22
MicH. L. REv. at 703 (1923); Monographic Note in 84 Am. St. Rep. 679 at
688; 2 A. & E. Eqc. L. 879; 5 A. & E. ENC. L. 476; 5 C. J. 4oi; 2 R. C. L.
446. But see I COOLEY, TORTS (3d ed. i9o6) 3o6-308, *203, 204.
" The following cases expressly held that an arrest without a warrant for
any misdemeanor other than a breach of the peace was not privilege even
though the misdemeanor was committed in the officer's presence. Roberson v.
State, 42 Fla. 223, 28 So. 427 (19oo) ; (but FLA. REv. GEN. STAT. (192o) §6o29
enacts the contrary rule); Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 7 Allen 583 (Mass.
1863) ; Commonwealth v. Wright, 158 Mass. 149, 33 N. E. 82 (1893) ; Robinson
v. Miner, 68 Mich. 549, 37 N. W. 21 (1888) (holding a statute conferring the
privilege to be unconstitutional) ; Butolph v. Blust, 5 Lans., 84 (N. Y. 1871),
(this has been changed by statute; see GILBERT, N. Y. CR. CODE (8th ed. 1925)
§ 177); Commonwealth v. Krubeck, 8 Pa. D. R. 521 (1899); Mundine v. State,
37 Tex. Cr. App. 5, 385 S. W. 61g (1897); M. K. & T. Ry. v. Warner, 19
Tex. Civ. App. 463, 495 S. W. 254 (1898); Lee v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. App. 94,
74 S. W. 28 (19o3). The following cases contain dicta to the same effect,
Staker v. U. S., 5 F.(2d) 312, 314 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925); Franklin v. Amer-
son, i18 Ga. 86o, 861, 45 S. E. 698 (1903) (the Ga. Code provides a different
rule); King v. Poe, 15 L. T. R. (N. s.) 37 (1866); Philadelphia v. Campbell,
ii Phila4 163 (1876) ; State v. Byrd, 72 S. C. 104, 51 S. E. 542 (igo5) (but
rule in South Carolina is contra by statute).
4 136 Wash. 228, 239 Pac. 386 (1925), quoting, inter alia, the dictum of
Taft, C. J., in Carroll v. U. S., as to which see infra.
'State v. Mills, 6 Pennew. 497 (Del. 19o8); Taafe v. Slevin, i1 Mo. App.
507 (1882).
cState v. Dietz, 59 Kan. 576, 53 Pac. 82o (1898) ; Webb v. State, 51 N.
J. L. 189, 17 Atl. 113 (1889); Rarick v. McManoman, I7 Pa. Super. 154
(9oi) ; Muscoe v. Comm., 86 Va. 443, 10 S. E. 534 (1890). In Webb v. State
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was there any reason for the court to distinguish between
breaches of the peace and other misdemeanors and the word
"misdemeanor" was used as a generic term and not as a term of
precision.
Some little doubt has been caused by the opinion of Chief
Justice Taft in Carroll v. U. S., supra. Prohibition officers
stopped and searched the defendant's automobile and, finding
liquor therein, seized the liquor and arrested the defendant. The
liquor so seized was admitted in evidence in a prosecution for vio-
lation of the Volstead Act. The admission of this liquor was
alleged to be error on the ground that it was procured by an
illegal search, it being further argued that the search was illegal
because it was part of an illegal arrest. Thus the question be-
fore the court was whether or not the search was illegal.
The majority of the court, in an exhaustive opinion on
searches and seizures by Chief Justice Taft, decide at the outset
that the National Prohibition Act gives officers power to make
searches of automobiles upon probable cause without warrant.
That, it would seem, determined the legality of search. All else
is dicta.
The defendant had also argued that a search without a
warrant must be limited, as an arrest for a misdemeanor with-
out warrant, to cases where the offense is committed in the offi-
cer's presence. Chief Justice Taft answers that, under a proper
construction of the Prohibition Act, the officer does not have to
be aware by his senses of the commission of the offense, but that
it is enough if he "discovers" it in any manner, as upon reliable
information.
It is evident that here the principal question was as to the
presence of the officer. For this question no distinction is neces-
the court says that "it has always been the common-law view that the constable
or peace officer in case of mere misdemeanor cannot take the offender unless,
in some instances, where the offense has been committed in his presence." The
phrase, in some instances, in all probability refers to the arrest of those found
"night walking" and "riding armed," for which, though misdemeanors, a privi-
lege to arrest was given by statutes so early as to have become part and parcel
of the common law, and to the arrest of "notorious cheats going about the
country with false dice," for which the privilege probably has a similar origin,
2 HALE, P.. C., chap. 12 § 20. Indeed, "in some instances" may be intended to
refer to breaches of the peace, which are a form of misdemeanor.
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sary or ever taken between misdemeanors which are and those
which are not breaches of the peace. Therefore, it is natural for
one to speak generally of misdemeanors and not make distinc-
tions where the distinctions make no difference.
It was in this connection that Chief Justice Taft said that
"a police officer . . . may arrest without warrant one guilty of
a misdemeanor only if committed in his presence." Three
things are to be noted: (i) The chief thing in Chief Justice
Taft's mind, and the chief point in the argument, was the ques-
tion of presence, as pointed out above. (The same is true in the
dissenting opinion of Justice McReynolds.) (2) As support for
the above quotation, Chief Justice Taft cites an extract from
Halsbury's Laws of England, which clearly makes the dis-
tinction between misdemeanors which are and those which
are not breaches of the peace. He also cites two Supreme Court
dicta in which the commission of the offense in the actor's pres-
ence was the sole question.7 (3) In further elaboration, Chief
Justice Taft says: "The reason for arrest for misdemeanors
without warrant at common law was promptly to suppress
breaches of the peace." It follows that where the misdemeanor
is not a breach of the peace, the reason for an arrest without a
warrant fails. And, by the old maxim, the reason for the rule
failing, the rule fails too.
It is difficult to see how the Carroll case can be taken as
authority for the proposition that an arrest can be made by a
peace officer without warrant for a misdemeanor less than a
breach of the peace. Yet the case has been taken to stand for
that proposition by some Federal courts and as so understood,
has been followed 8 and is cited in dicta where the issue was as
to the officer's presence. 9
The possession, or sale, or manufacture of intoxicating
'Justice McReynolds, who states the privilege of arrest in substantially
the same terms as Chief Justice Taft, in'support thereof cites cases which dis-
tinguish between breaches of the peace and other misdemeanors.
8Vaught v. U. S., 7 F.(2d) 371 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) ; U. S. v. Lindsly,
7 F. (2d) 247 (E. D. La. 1925); Bell v. U. S., 9 F. (2d) 82o (C. C. A. 9th,
1925).
' People v. Hutchinson, 9 F. (2d) 275 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) ; Peru v. U. S.,
4 F.(2d) 881 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
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liquor is a misdemeanor by federal law. Even before the Carroll
case, several federal courts held that an officer might arrest
one who, in the officer's presence, possesses, sells or manufac-
tures liquor.10
The authority of these cases as stating the common law
is shaken by holdings in some late federal cases that the power to
make arrests without warrant under the above circumstances is
to be derived not from the common law, but from a proper con-
struction of the National Prohibition Act, even as intimated in
the Carroll case."
In Rouda v. U. S.,12 Learned Hand, J., writing for the
court, derived the above power from the Prohibition Act after
a close examination of the various provisions of the Act. In
the course of the opinion, Judge Hand said: "While a peace offi-
cer might at common law arrest without warrant for a misde-
meanor committed in his presence, which was a breach of the
peace, his power to do so in other cases is at best most uncertain."
Were it not for the Washington case and the federal cases which
construe the language used by Chief Justice Taft in Carroll v.
U. S. as stating his opinion that a peace officer may arrest with-
out a warrant for any misdemeanor committed in his presence,
it would be possible to say that the common law has never recog-
nized any such privilege.
It may, however, be suggested that while the construction
put by the courts upon Carroll v. U. S. is in conflict with the
common law of England and with even the majority of Ameri-
can states, it may be a wise and sound piece of judicial legisla-
tion. In support of this it may be urged that a great majority
of the states have enacted statutes which give peace officers a
" Vachina v. U. S., 283 Fed. 35 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922); McBride v. U. S.,284 Fed. 416 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922); Cabbitt v. Potter, 293 Fed. 54 (D. C.
Mass. 1923); U. S. v. Stafford, 286 Fed. 702 (E. D. Ky. 1923); U. S. v.
Seltzer, 5 F.(2d) 364 (D. C. Mass. 1925).
'In Altshuler v. U. S., 3 F.(2d) 791 (C. C. A., 3d, 1925), and Marson v.U. S., 8 F.(2d) 251 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925), such was the holding without extended
argument.
22 10F.(2d) 916 (C. C. A.2d, 1926).
Gidden v. State, 154 Ga. 54, 113 S. E. 386 (1922); People v. McLean,68 Mich. 480, 36 N. W. 231 (1888); People v. Shanley, 4o Hun 477 (N. Y.
1886).
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privilege as broad or broader. Many of these statutes, however,
confer this privilege upon only certain classes of peace officers
and the recognition of a common law privilege to arrest for
any misdemeanor committed in the presence of an officer, would
very considerably add to the number Of officers privileged to
make such arrests. The mere fact that legislatures have adopted
such a course does not necessarily prove its wisdom; it certainly
does not prove that it is wise to extend the policy underlying such
statutes further than the legislatures have chosen to go. After
all, we should not in our desire to punish crime, overlook the in-
terests of individuals. Indeed, the interest of the citizen in not
being arrested unnecessarily is the inspiration for the tendency
of modem criminal laws to provide that the alleged offender
shall be brought into court by a summons and not by arrest.
The privilege to arrest without a warrant will undoubtedly
lead to officers taking into custody persons for offenses which,
though actually committeed and in the presence of the officer,
are subsequently deemed too insignificant to warrant prosecu-
tion. Unless there is some reason to suppose that the offender
will escape unless he is immediately arrested, the delay incident
to obtaining a warrant will not injure the interest of the state in
punishing him.
The common law privilege to arrest for a breach of the
peace was not given as a thing in itself. As Chief Justice Taft
himself points out in Carroll v. U. S., it was part and parcel of
the privilege to preserve the public peace by preventing breaches
thereof. As such it was a privilege which the peace officer
shared with the private person. It was only when the offense
was a felony that the privilege to arrest without warrant was
given for the sole purpose of securing the apprehension of a
criminal. Indeed, if, as is suggested, the only reason for per-
mitting the arrest of a mere misdemeanant, who commits his
offenses in the presence of a peace officer, is danger that the de-
lay incident to obtaining the warrant will allow him to escape,
there is no reason to confine the privilege to arrest for such
offenses to misdemeanors committed in the officer's presence. It
should apply equally, as does the privilege to arrest for felony,
ARREST WITH AND WITHOUT A WARRANT
to a misdemeanant whose offense is complete and over before
the officer arrives on the scene. The passion of modern legisla-
tures for the regulation of the most intimate concerns of every-
day life is notorious. The legislative mill turns out a steady addi-
tion to the list of misdemeanors. These are oppressive enough
if administered with the deliberation inherent in the require-
ment of a warrant or summons. They become doubly intolerable
if every over-zealous peace officer, actuated by a lofty but incon-
venient crusading spirit, is permitted to take up, on sight, every
person whom he detects in the act of committing a misdemeanor.
If legislatures choose to go so far, there is perhaps no remedy for
their desire to sacrifice the reasonable convenience of their citi-
zens on the altar of supposed public need. But it would be a
grave error to adopt any such privilege into the common law. If
a particular misdemeanor is of such a character and the punish-
ment thereof so great that there is real danger of the escape of
the criminal unless he is immediately arrested, an emergency
arises similar to that which exists in the case of a felony. Intelli-
gent legislation can provide an exceptional privilege for such an
exceptional case. To give a common law privilege to arrest for
all misdemeanors, because some few of them are of this char-
acter, is like killing all the cattle in a state because a few are
suspected of having foot-and-mouth disease.
At least let us be thankful that Chief Justice Taft does not
suggest a common law privilege to arrest on sight for any pub-
lic offense. This would include breaches of municipal ordi-
nances as well as statutory misdemeanors. Everything that has
been said as to the unnecessary annoyance caused by arrest with-
out warrant for minor misdemeanors is doubly pertinent to
arrest for the breach of an ordinance. People no longer live
their whole lives in the village in which they were born. They
pass freely from place to place, and in transit go through innu-
merable towns and villages. The risk of being arrested on sight,
because one's conduct contravenes some regulation which the
wisdom of the local Solons deems necessary, is appalling to any
thinking person. It would be impossible to know at what mo-
ment one might become amenable to arrest. Even that out-
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worn and discredited fiction that every man knows the law has
never been pushed to such an extreme as to justify imposing such
consequences upon an ignorance of the local ordinances of the
myriads of small communities through which modern men con-
stantly pass.
II.
ARREST UNDER A WARRANT WHICH is NOT IN THE
ACTOR'S POSSESSION AT THE TIME OF ARREST.
If the offense charged in the warrant is a breach of the
peace or other misdemeanor, a person arresting or attempting
to arrest another under the authority of the warrant but not
having the warrant in his possession is not so far privileged as to
make the other's resistance to the arrest unprivileged.13
In Codd v. Cabe,'4 a warrant was addressed to all con-
stables. The chief constable retained the warrant and instructed
his under-constables to make the arrest. The defendant was held
privileged to resist an attempt by one of the under-constables to
make the arrest. In Adams v. State,'- the defendants were held
not guilty of a rescue under similar circumstances. In Webb
v. State,16 an officer was held guilty of assault in arresting a
third party assisting another in resisting such an arrest. In such
a case it is immaterial that the person arrested did not request to
see the warrant or that he knew or did not know that the war-
rant had been issued. It is directly ruled in the following cases,
as well as stated in the opinions of those above cited, that a per-
son so arresting another is liable for false imprisonment.' 7 The
arrest is treated as though it were made without a warrant, and
the decisions are based on the ground that an arrest cannot be
made without a warrant for a misdemeanor not committed in
the presence of the officer, if it can be made at all, and the argu-
ment that there is a warrant outstanding is met by an insistence
1'I Ex. D. 352 (1876).
is121 Ga. 163, 48 S. E. 910 (904).
is51 N. J. L. 189, 17 Atl. II3 (1889).
"McCullough v. Greenfield, 133 Mich. 463, 95 N. W. 532 (19o3) ; Kratzer
v. Matthews, 233 Mich. 452, 206 N. W. 982 (1926); Smith v. Clark, 53 N.
J. L. 197, 21 At]. 491 (891).
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upon the requirement that one arresting under a warrant must
show it if requested to do so, which is manifestly impossible
unless he has the warrant in his possession.
The only case which expresses a contrary opinion is Cabell
v, Arnold,'8 in which, overruling the decision of the Court of
Civil Appeals, 19 the court holds that, although one whose arrest
is so attempted is privileged to resist, the officer so making the
arrest is not liable. The authority of this case is weakened by
the fact that, although the language of the court is general and
therefore applicable both to arrests for misdemeanor and for
felony, the crime for which the arrest was made was a felony,
and it is universally held that a peace officer may arrest for a
felony without a warrant and therefore may arrest when a war-
rant has been issued without having it in his possession, the
issuance of the warrant being sufficient grounds for his reason-
able suspicion both that a felony has been committed and that
the person named in the warrant is guilty thereof.
20
It is necessary here to distinguish between cases where the
arrest is made under the command of a person holding the war-
rant and in the presence of such person, and cases in which it
is made by such command but not in such person's presence. In
Coyle v. Hurtin,21 a sheriff held a warrant charging a breach of
the peace. He took his posse with him to serve the warrant.
Being unable to overcome the resistance of those charged in the
warrant, he left several of his posse on the spot to prevent the
escape of these persons and to arrest them if possible, while he,
still holding the warrant, went to a neighboring town for further
assistance. It was held that the men left upon the spot might
make the arrest in the sheriff's absence. This case may be sus-
tained on the ground that, while the sheriff was not actually
present, he was at the time engaged in acts which, in his opinion
at least, were necessary to effect the arrest. This distinction
might be thus phrased: One who at the command of a third
'86 Tex. 102, 23 S. W. 645 (1893).
'22 S. W. 62 (1893).
See Codd v. Cabe, supra note 14, and cases cited supra note 13.
1 io Johns. 85 (N. Y. 1813).
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person and in his absence arrests another under the authority
of a warrant not in his possession, although in the possession of
the third person, is not privileged if such third person has merely
delegated the service of the warrant to him and is himself not
doing anything at the time to secure the particular arrest in
which the actor is assisting; on the other hand, if the third per-
son continues to be engaged in effecting that arrest, the actor
who has been assisting him in his efforts may, during the third
person's temporary absence, continue his assistance, and there-
fore is privileged to arrest, even though the third person having
the warrant is temporarily absent from the place of arrest. Since
the actor is only protected if he is assisting the third person in
the very arrest which the third person is seeking to accomplish,
this would not cover a case in which the third person was seek-
ing to arrest the criminal at one point and had sent his subordi-
nates without warrants to arrest at other points. If this dis-
tinction is sound, it is only needed, and is, therefore, only ap-
plicable, to a breach of the peace or other misdemeanor.
III.
THE PRIVILEGE TO USE DEADLY FORCE TO EFFECT AN
ARREST WITH OR WITHOUT A WARRANT.
It is well settled that an officer attempting to make a privi-
leged arrest of another with or without a warrant, for a breach
of the peace or other misdemeanor or for the violation of a
municipal ordinance, is not privileged to use force intended or
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, although it is im-
possible otherwise to effect the arrest. On the other hand, it is
often broadly stated that an officer attempting to arrest, with
or without a warrant, another charged with, or suspected of,
felony, is privileged to use deadly force, if it is absolutely neces-
sary to do so in order to effect the other's arrest, and that the
officer, having lawfully arrested 'another for a felony, is privi-
leged to take the other's life, if his escape cannot otherwise be
prevented.
Two problems arise, first: May deadly force be used if
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necessary to effect a privileged arrest for any felony, or is the
use of such force restricted only to certain felonies? Second:
Should any distinction be drawn between the use of such force,
(a) to effect an arrest by preventing flight and (b) to effect
such an arrest by overcoming resistance interposed by either
the person sought to be arrested or a third person, the person
seeking the arrest having no reason to believe that the force
used in resistance is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury
to him or any third person?
I.
At a time when all felonies were punishable by death, it is
not unnatural that the killing of an actual or suspected felon
should be regarded as preferable to his escape from arrest. The
felon's life was forfeit. His killing was at best an extra-judicial
and premature execution of a penalty which he had already in-
curred by his felony. It was the actual felon, and not the inno-
cent man suspected of felony, who usually fled from or resisted
arrest. But the severity of criminal law has been universally
relaxed by removing the death penalty from less serious felonies
and in some jurisdictions by removing the death penalty even
from those of an exceedingly grave character. In addition, it is
common experience that legislatures often make conduct a fel-
ony, either by so declaring it or by attaching to it a penalty which
automatically makes it a felony, although such conduct involves
as little, or less, serious consequences and which shows as little,
or less depravity of character than offenses which are made mis-
demeanors. This tendency is exhibited in practically every
criminal code of the individual states and is even more marked
when the codes of the various states are compared with one an-
other. It is therefore not surprising that there is no American
case which actually sustains the privilege to use deadly force for
the sole purpose of effecting an arrest for an offense merely be-
cause the offense is a felony at common law or is made such by
5tatute, and that there are a number of dicta which doubt the
applicability of so broad a privilege to modern conditions and
its consonance with modern public opinion.
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Thus in U. S. v. Clark,22 Brown, J., afterwards of the Su-
preme Court of the United States, said as to this broad state-
ment:
"I doubt, however, whether this law would be directly
applicable to the present day. Suppose for example, a per-
son were arrested for petit larceny, which is a felony at com-
mon law, might an officer under any circumstances be justi-
fied in killing him? I think not. The punishment is
naturally too disproportionate to the magnitude of the of-
fense."
In State v. Bryant,23 Reade, J., says:
"It must be, however, that the powers of arresting and
the means used must be enlarged or modified by the character
of the felony. The importance to society of having felons
arrested in cases of capital felonies-such as murder and
rape-must be greater than in cases of inferior felonies such
as larceny. . . . Extreme measures, therefore, which
might be resorted to in capital felonies would shock us if re-
sorted to in inferior felonies."
In Reneau v. State2 4 McFarland, J., says:
"And we may add that it may be a question worthy of
consideration whether the law ought not to be modified in re-
spect to the lower grade of felonies, especially in view of the
large number of crimes of this character created by compara-
tively recent legislation, whether as to these even escape
would not be better than to take life."
In view of the lack of authority upon the extent of the
privilege to use deadly force to effect arrest for felony, it is
necessary to turn to the many decisions upon the closely related
subject of the privilege to kill to prevent the commission of a
felony. The two subjects are not only in their nature closely
similar, but an attempt to prevent a felony is exceedingly likely
to be followed up by the arrest or an attempted arrest of the felon.
So long as a felon's goods ,were forfeitable to the crown,
the crown had the peculiar interest in the conviction, and there-
31 Fed. 710 (C. C. Mich. 1887).
65 N. C. 327 at 328 (1871).
24 2 Lea 720 (Tenn. 1879).
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fore in the apprehension of a felon, which was different in kind
and far more personal than the interest which it had in securing
the good order of the realm in -the prevention of felonies. But
today the interest of the state in preventing crime is as great as,
if not greater than, the interest of the state in its punishment.
The privilege to use deadly force to arrest a felon should not
exist unless the felony is at the least of such a character that the
use of such force would be privileged for the purpose of prevent-
ing it.
The history of the privilege to use deadly force to prevent
crime shows a constant restriction of the privilege. Originally
it would seem that the privilege to kill to prevent crime was ex-
ceedingly broad. Lord Coke says that it is permissible to kill
to prevent the commission of a felony even though the felony
could have been prevented by milder means.2 5 Even in Black-
stone's time the privilege seems to have been much restricted.
He says that: "Where a crime itself capital is endeavored to be
committed by" force, it is lawful to repel that force by the death
of the party attempting." 26 Certainly no American court recog-
nizes a privilege to kill to prevent the most heinous of felonies,
punishable by death, unless there appears at least reasonable
doubt of a possibility of otherwise preventing its commission.
But even the privilege stated by Blackstone was still further
limited by the relaxation of the severity of the punishment im-
posed for felonies. The abolition of the death penalty for all
but a few felonies, destroyed the reason for holding that, while
it was not permissible to kill to prevent the commission of a mis-
demeanor, it was permissible to kill to prevent any felony. Many
cases, both English and American, have held that there is no
privilege to kill to prevent larcenies which were felonies both at
common law and by statute.27  If the mere fact that a particu-
: 3 Co. INST. *56.
'4 BL. Comm. *181.
"Rex. v. Scully, C. & P. 317 (1824) (defendant shot the man who got
into his master's yard to steal chickens from the hen roost). The court charged
that the defendant had no right to shoot the deceased unless he considered his
life in danger. Reg. v. Murphy, i Craw. & D. 18 (1839), (defendant shot a
person caught in the act of carrying away timber stolen from the premises of
the defendant's master). In this case the court held that the use of deadly
force was privileged to prevent only such felonies as are punishable by death.
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lar offense is a felony at common law is not enough to confer the
privilege, a fortiori there is even greater reason to hold that
the fact that a particular offense is made a felony by the statute
which makes it a crime is not enough to confer a privilege to
use such force to prevent its commission.
But it does not follow that the mere fact that a particular
offense is a felony by statute rather than by common law should
preclude a privilege to use deadly force to prevent its commis-
sion. It is the nature of the offense, the serious consequences
which it threatens and the depraved and desperate character of
its perpetrators which should determine the extent to which
force should be used, and not its origin on the common law or
the statute.28
With one exception to be noted hereafter, the privilege to
use deadly force, either to prevent a felony or to effect the arrest
of one guilty or suspected thereof, has been confined to felonies
which not only are committed by violence but also involve a
danger to life and female honor.
2 9
Such felonies are usually committed by persons of moral
depravity and desperate character. It is true that lesser offenses
may also involve moral depravity and may often be committed by
men of desperate character. This of itself is not enough to
justify the killing or wounding of such lesser criminals to pre-
vent such crimes or to secure the arrest of persons guilty thereof.
But it is a factor which increases enormously the chance of
dangerously violent resistance to arrest and so, if the crime is
a violent felony, involving danger to human life or female honor,
Storey v. State, 7i Ala. 329 (1882) (horse stealing). Carmouche v. Bouis, 6
La. Ann. 95, 97 (1851) (pocket picking) ; Gardiner v. Thibodeau, 14 La. Ann.
732 (I8sg), and McClellan v. Kay, 14 B. Monroe lO3 (Ky. 1853) (the owner
of a slave killed while stealing chickens, was held entitled to recover for the
value of the slave).
'In the case of Smith v. State, 127 Iowa 534, lO3 N. W. 944 (I9O5), this
element is perhaps least marked. In that case the offense was the rescue of a
prisoner, which was by statute made a felony. A rescue, however, is exceed-
ingly apt to be accompanied by or lead td a deadly affray, and the danger to
life, though not as marked as in the case of highway robbery or burglary, is
none the less clearly present, and see Oliver v. State, 17 Ala. 587 (1850) ; Car-
roll v. State, 23 Ala. 28 (1853) ; Dill v. State, 25 Ala. 15 (1854).
'In THoMPsoN, CASES ON SELF-DEFENSE 901 and in Storey v. State, 71
Ala. 329 at 339, 340 (1882), it is pointed out that text-writers since Blackstone,
with the exception of Bishop, all state the law to be that fatal force may only
be used to prevent "forcible" and "violent" felonies.
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gives an additional reason for permitting the use of deadly
force to effect the arrest of the actual or supposed felon. In-
deed, the fact that these felonies carry with them the most ex-
treme punishment is likely to lead those engaged therein to go to
extreme lengths to prevent their arrest. Perhaps these factors
should more legitimately be considered in determining whether
an officer is acting in privileged self-defense if he uses deadly
force to effect the arrest of such a felon. It is quite clear that
under such circumstances the slightest indication of an intention
to pse deadly force to prevent the arrest would be sufficient to
jiustify the officer in believing his life imperiled, while similar
cotiduc t on the pqrt of a person sought to be arrested for a minormisdemeanor, or a breaclh of anq ordinance carrying a small pen-
alty, might not be sufficient so to do. These factors may, how-
ever, have a legitimate importance in determining whether the
officer may not even in advance of any actual demonstration by
such a suspected felon use deadly force to effect his arrest. It
may well be considered that an officer should not be put to the
peril of waiting until the suspected felon commits some overt act
manifesting even to the most suspicious mind an intention to use
deadly force. For the protection of the officer, he may legiti-
mately be permitted to forestall the deadly resistance which such
a felon is extremely likely to interpose.
There is a tendency to regard the breaking and entering of
a building in which property of value is kept or stored, if made
a felony by statute, as similar in character and therefore in all its
legal consequences to the nocturnal breaking and entering of a
dwelling-place. This is so irrespective of the presence or absence
of any watchman whose life may be imperiled. This tendency
seems to be substantially unanimous in one class of cases deal-
ing with the protection of real property from felonious entry.
There are a number of cases in which it has been held proper to
use spring guns and other forms of protection, both intended
and likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, to protect from
nocturnal felonious entry, places which while not in use as resi-
dences, are used for the keeping or storing of property.30 If the
See- Bohlen and Bums, Privilege to Protect Property, etc., 35 YALE L. J.
527 (1926) nn. 39-48.
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analogy between prevention and arrest suggested above is per-
tinent, it would seem that courts should not distinguish between
these two classes of buildings in determining whether deadly
force can be used in arresting one guilty or suspected of a felo-
nious entry thereon. Such crimes have been brought prominently
to public attention by their great frequency. They are normally
committed by a class substantially as desperate and depraved as
those who commit common law burglaries. There is the same
reason therefore to permit officers to forestall dangerous resist-
ance in the one case as in the other.
In the interest of certainty and consistency, it is to be hoped
that courts will continue to restrict within the limits indicated,
the privilege to use deadly force to prevent felonies or to effect
arrest therefor. It is, however, possible that a settled and per-
sistent course of opinion in some particular locality may regard
certain offenses, which are constantly committed in that locality,
as being equally heinous in character as those above mentioned.
If so, the courts of such localities will probably and perhaps
properly hold that there is a privilege to use deadly force to pre-
vent the commission of such offenses or to arrest persons guilty
or suspected thereof. In determining this, some weight is to be
given to the punishment imposed by statute. Such a sentiment
is apt to be aroused where particular forms of offenses, generally
depredations against property, are constantly committed, and
the severe penalties of the statutes are designed to deter from
repetition.
It would seem, however, that if public opinion in a particular
state regards a particular offense as more heinous than it is else-
where regarded, and therefore believes that its commission
should carry all the penalties elsewhere attached to felonies uni-
versally regarded as particularly grave, the statute which attaches
the severe penalty to its commission should also expressly pro-
vide that killing is justified if necessary to prevent it or arrest
one guilty or suspected thereof.
Thus the prevalence of chicken stealing and the impos-
sibility of preventing it by trial and punishment of those guilty
thereof, has led Texas to pass an act to justify killing when neces-
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sary to prevent it.31 The statute is silent as to the privilege to
kill to secure the apprehension of persons guilty or suspected of
chicken stealing, but it is at least arguable that the legislature,
by giving the privilege to prevent an offense, has marked it as
sufficiently serious to justify killing to arrest the person guilty
or suspected thereof.
The cases are unanimous to the effect that no one, even an
officer, may kill or inflict serious wounds to prevent a person
whom he is attempting to arrest for a misdemeanor, either with
or without a warrant, from escaping by flight from arrest or from
his custody after arrest.
32
On the other hand, in at least two states it is held that an
officer who is attempting to arrest a person for a misdemeanor,
either with or without a warrant, may kill or seriously wound
such person if it is necessary to do so in order to overcome re-
sistance which such person actively interposes to the arrest, al-
though his resistance is not such as to threaten death or seri-
ous bodily injury to the officer.
33
'See Grant v. Hess, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 688 (19o3).
"2See I EAST P. C. 302 (i8o3) ; 2 BISHoP, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. I913),
§§ 647-5o; U. S. v. Clark, 31 Fed. 710, 713 (C. C. Mich. 1887); Thomas v.
Kinkead, 55 Ark. 5o2, 17 S. W. 854 (1892); Head v. Martin, 85 Ky. 481, 3
S. W. 52o (I89O) ; People v. Kline, 3o5 Ill. 141, 137 N. E. 145 (1923) ; Brown
v. Weaver, 76 Miss. 7, 15, 23 So. 388 (1898); State v. Cunningham, IO7 Miss.
14o, 65 So. 15 (914) ; State v. Sigman, io6 N. C. 728, 1i S. E. 520 (I89O);
Reneau v. State, 2 Lea 72o (Tenn. 1879).
"Missouri, State v. MacNally, 87 Mo. 644, 653, 656 (1885) ; State v. Dier-
burger, 96 Mo. 666, io S. W. 168 (1888) ; North Carolina, State v. Garrett,
6o N. C. 144 (x863) ; State v. Deering, 177 N. C. 559, 98 S. E. 530 (1919).
Bishop states the law to the same effect. His statement in I CRIMINAL
PROaCEUR (4th ed. I895) § 161, is based on two Texas cases, in neither of
which is there so much as a dictum supporting his view. See Thomas v. Kin-
kead, 55 Ark. 502, i8 S. W. 854 (0892) for a valuable criticism of Bishop's
statements. In 2 CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) § 65o, he cites 2 HALE P. C.
117 (1847), and quotes substantially the following extract from I EAST P. C.
302 (i8o3), "but as in the case of a felon, so here (where the one sought to
be arrested for a misdemeanor resists the officer) if the officer meet with re-
sistance and kill the offender in the struggle, he will be justified." The privi-
lege is here stated very broadly and it would seem to indicate that the officer
is privileged to kill, not so much for the purpose of effecting the arrest, as
for the purpose of defending himself. The only apposite authority cited is
2 HALE P. C. 117 (1847), in which it is said: "But if A, either upon the at-
tempt to arrest, or after the arrest, assault the minister that hath the warrant
to arrest him, to the intent to make his escape from him, and the minister
standing upon his guard kills him, this is no felony, for being by law author-
ized to arrest him, he is not bound to go back to the wall, as in common cases
of se defendendo for the law is his protection. And, therefore, as on the one
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In Terrell v. Comm.,3 4 there is a dictum which at first glance
may appear capable of a construction favorable to this view. But
the language is exceedingly vague and such a construction would
be directly contra to earlier cases.-3
The reason given in the head-note to State v. Garrett,36 is
that "the principle of self-defense does not apply to one who
puts himself in the posture of armed resistance to the process
of the state." This head-note is misleading, as the defendant
was not a person resisting the arrest, but an officer overcoming
such a person's resistance by deadly weapons. In the same case
Chief Justice Pierson makes the equally misleading statement
that "When a man puts himself in a state of resistance and openly
defies the officer of the law, he is not allowed, if his life is
thereby imperiled, to set up the excuse of self-defense." One
who attempts to avoid the service of a lawful warrant seems
also to put himself in opposition to the will of the state. The
actual fact is that a man flees if he has the opportunity and re-
sists only where flight is impossible. Certainly a man defies an
officer of the law as much by fleeing as by resisting and clearly
the defiance of the law is far more marked where a third party
attempts the forcible rescue of a person. Yet even here it is
held in Smith v. State 31 that, in the absence of a statute making
the rescue a felony, the officer is not justified in killing to pre-
vent even a forcible rescue.
side if A kills him it is murder, so on the other side, if upon this assault by
A the minister kills him, it is no felony, the necessity excuseth him, if he
cannot otherwise save himself and perform his duty." This goes no farther
than the accepted view that an officer is not bound to retreat or desist from
his effort to make the arrest before defending himself against deadly or serious
bodily injury by means likely to cause the same result to his assailant. The
charge of Holroyd, J., in Forster's case in i Lewin C. C. 187 (1825), is as
follows: "An officer may not kill for an escape where the party is in custody
for a misdemeanor, but if the prisoner (the officer) had reasonable grounds in
believing himself to be imperiled of his own life or of bodily harm and no
other weapons at hand to make use of, thus he was justified" in shooting his
prisoner. Obviously Justice Holroyd did not believe that the privilege to kill
one arrested for misdemeanor went beyond legitimate self-defense.
194 Ky. 6o8, 66, 24o S. W. 88 (1922).
"Stephens v. Comm., 20 Ky. L. 544, 47 S. W. 229 (1898) ; Dilger v.
Comm., 88 Ky. 550, 56o, ii S. W. 651 (0889) ; Donehy v. Comm., 170 Ky. 474,
186 S. W. i61 (1916), none of which are mentioned in Terrell v. Comm.
"' Supra note 33.
,7 IoI N. W. Iio (Iowa 1904).
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In Stephens v. Comm.,3 8 the defendant took hold of a man
named Miller, a member of a group who the officer believed were
breaking the peace, for the purpose of arresting him. Miller
pulled away from the defendant, who testified that the crowd
"rushed on him," and, to save himself from imminent peril, he
shot Miller. The court said that "there was scarcely a shadow
of proof to show that the officer was in any danger" and held
that the trial judge had erroneously instructed the jury that the
defendant had the right to use such force as was necessary to
arrest Miller, since "the force to be used in making an arrest
(for a breach of the peace) .'must at least stop short with that
which would result in a loss of human life," citing Dilger v.
Comm. 3' In the latter case, the defendant attempted to justify
a killing of an officer as being in self-defense against excessive
force used by the officer in attempting to effect the defendant's
arrest. This brought up directly the question as to whether the
officer was privileged to use deadly weapons to effect the arrest
of the defendant for a misdemeanor. The court said "in a case
of a felon, the officer may use such force as is necessary to cap-
ture the felon, even to kill to prevent flight. Where it is a mis-
demeanant, however, the rule is otherwise. It is his duty to
make the arrest, but, unless the offender is resisting to such an
extent as to place the officer in danger of loss of life or bodily
harm, the officer cannot kill him."
In State v. Smith,40 the court approved of a charge that an
officer has no right to take the life "of a misdemeanant whom he
is seeking to arrest" or to inflict on him a great bodily harm."
In a former opinion of the same case, 41 the court held that
an officer has no right to kill one who was attempting the
forcible rescue of his prisoner. This opinion was withdrawn,
apparently because the court for the first time realized that Sec-
tion 4896 of the Iowa Code had made it a felony to aid an ar-
rested person in escaping. In addition to this, a later Iowa case,
"' Supra note 35.
1' Ibid.
40 127 Iowa 534, lO3 N. W. 944 (igo5).
Supra note 37.
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State v. Towne,4 2 holds that a private person attempting to make
a lawful arrest of another for a breach of the peace was not
privileged to use deadly force for the purpose of overcoming the
other's resistance. While the precise point does not seem to have
come before any court for decision in other jurisdictions, there
are a quantity of dicta supporting the view expressed in the in-
struction approved in State v. Smith.43
Francis H. Bohlen.
Harry Shulman.
Harvard University Law School.
42 18o Iowa 339, 16o N. W. io (917).
4'Bert v. State, 156 Ala. 29, 46 So. 858 (i9o8) ; Holland v. State, 162 Ala.
5, 5o So. 215 (19o9); Loveless v. Hardy, 2oi Ala. 6o5, 79 So. 37 (1918);
Thomas v. Kinkead, 55 Ark. 502, 5o9, 18 S. W. 854 (892) ; State v. Smith, 59
Ark. 132, 139, 26 S. W. 712 (1894); Brown v. Weaver, 76 Minn. 715, 23 So.
388 (1898) ; Pamplin v. State, 205 Pac. 521 (Okla. Cr. App. 1922) ; KERR, Hom-
ICIDE (1891) 187, 2 A. & E. ENC. L. (2d ed. 1898) 849, and 5 C. J. 426, state
the law to the same effect, as do also the notes to Brown v. Weaver, 71 Am. St.
Rep. 519, and Petri v. Cartwright, 102 Am. St Rep. 278.
